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Abstract:  
Much research focuses on development of new agricultural technologies to reduce 
poverty levels of the large population of smallholder farms in Sub Saharan Africa. In this 
paper we argue that smallholders can also increase their production in a different way, 
namely by using their resources more efficiently through cooperation. This is obtained by 
grouping their (heterogeneous) resources and making joint decisions based on the 
aggregate resources. Afterwards, the gains of the joint production are divided, such that 
each farmer remains independent.  
This type of cooperation is modeled using linear programming and cooperative game 
theory. While linear programming establishes insight in optimal farm plans for farmers 
that cooperate, game theory is used to generate fair divisions of the extra gain that is 
established by cooperation. 
The model is applied to a village in Northern Nigeria. Households are clustered based on 
socio-economic parameters, and we explore cooperation. The optimal farm plan of the 
cooperative (i.e., farmers cooperate) contains more crops with high market and nutritional 
value, such as cowpea and sugarcane. We show that the gross margin of the cooperative 
is 12% higher than the sum of the individual gross margins. To divide these gains, we 
consider four established solution concepts from game theory that divide these extra 
gains: the Owen value, Shapley value, compromise value and nucleolus. An interesting 
result is that all farmers gain from cooperation and that the four solution concepts give 
similar results. Finally, we show how the provision of micro-credit can be used to 
stimulate cooperation in practice, benefiting the least-endowed farmers as well. 
 
Keywords: Linear Programming, Agriculture, Household models, Cooperative Game 
Theory, Nigeria 
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1. Introduction 
In Sub Saharan Africa approximately 64 % of the population lives in rural areas (FAO 
STAT, 2007), primarily earning their income from farming and related activities 
(Manyong et al., 2005). The average farm size is small, while labour at the farm is mostly 
provided by the family. These small-scale farmers mainly use their income for 
purchasing food and other primary necessities of life. Their development is constrained 
by weak infrastructure, such as bad roads leading to poor access to agricultural input and 
output markets, and lack of basic amenities such as clean water and electricity.  
Many development programmes and research institutes strive to reduce poverty 
levels of this large population of farmers (IITA, 2006). A considerable part of their 
research and activities focuses on development of new agricultural technologies, such as 
new varieties of crops and improved agricultural systems, with the aim to increase local 
production and generate wealth (World Bank 2008). 
In this research we propose a different approach to increase local production. The 
keyword in this approach is cooperation, which enables the farmers to use available on-
farm resources more efficiently. Small-scale farmers are heterogeneous with respect to 
their resources (Ruben and Pender, 2004). For example, some farmers have an excess of 
land, given their labour and capital resources, while other farmers may have excess of 
other resources. However, these resources are not commonly traded, and the excess 
resources remain unused, usually as a result of weak or absent markets. Common reasons 
of such market imperfections include high transaction costs due to weak infrastructure, 
absence of a credit market facilitating trades, risk and uncertainty and information 
asymmetry (De Janvry et al, 1991;  Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Note that we do 
not exclude the need for developing new and improved technologies, which can easily be 
incorporated in this approach.  
In this paper we model a farm cooperative1 in which farmers group their 
resources, i.e., land, labour and capital, and jointly make decisions based on the aggregate 
resources after which they divide the gains of the joint production. Hence, (in the absence 
of market clearing of excess resources,) such cooperation between farmers, in which they 
group complementary resources, leads to more (allocatively) efficient production.  
The innovation in the framework presented in this paper is the application of 
linear production games (Owen, 1975) to model farm cooperative in a rural African 
setting. Linear production games combine linear programming (LP) and cooperative 
game theory. While a suitable LP model determines an optimal farm plan for each 
possible collection of farmers, cooperative game theory is used to divide the gain in a 
farm cooperative. 
First, we develop a farm household model, using LP. This model is based on the 
commonly applied agricultural farm household model, e.g. described by Schweigman 
(1985) and Hazell & Norton (1986). An extensive body of research uses such models to 
analyse farm household decisions. See Hazell and Norton (1986) for an overview, more 
recent applications include amongst others, Abdoulaye and Sanders (2006), Dorward 
(2006), and Woelcke (2006). These LP models represent the main decisions in a farm 
household, namely, production, market and consumption decisions. The constraints 
                                                 
1 Note that a farm cooperative is different from a collective farm, which is operated and owned by a group 
of people, i.e., like the Kibbuts in Israel. This is contrary to our approach, where farmers remain 
independent.  
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reflect the major resources used in farming: land, labour, and capital. The solution of the 
LP model leads to an optimal farm plan.  
As cooperation possibly leads to more efficient use of resources, total gain from 
farm production is likely to increase. Indeed, in such a case a problem arises on how to 
divide this extra gain among the cooperating farmers. Clearly, a farmer is only inclined to 
join a cooperative if the expected return is higher than when producing alone. This 
equally applies to every other farmer. Moreover a farmer is likely to remain part of the 
cooperative in the long-run, if his return is representative to his contribution, and if there 
is no distrust about the fairness of the division. Hence, a fair division rule needs to be 
established for long-run stability, such that distrust amongst farmers is prevented. 
For the construction of such a division rule we turn to cooperative game theory. 
Cooperative game theory is a mathematical framework to analyse cooperation. Its main 
focus lies on the study of divisions of joint revenues in cooperatives. For a theoretical 
overview on cooperative games we refer to Tijs (2003). Empirical applications of 
cooperative game theory in agriculture and land use include Aadland and Kolpin (1998), 
Suzuki and Nakayama (1976) and Lejano and Davos (1999), though applications in a 
rural African setting are currently unknown to the authors. 
We apply four game theoretical concepts in our framework: the Owen value 
(Owen, 1975), Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), and 
compromise value (Tijs, 1981). Each of these concepts proposes a division of the extra 
gains that are established by cooperation from a different point of view.   
We illustrate the applicability of the framework by presenting a case study of 
rural households in Northern Nigeria. The objectives are to show how farm plans change 
when farmers cooperate, to measure the magnitude of gains in cooperation compared to 
without cooperation, to compare outcomes from different concepts, and to suggest a 
strategy to stimulate cooperation. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we provide some preliminaries on 
LP and game theory. We describe the cooperative model in Section 3. Thereafter, in 
Section 4, we discuss the data and area of study and in Section 5 the results of the applied 
model are described. In Section 6 we provide an example of a micro-credit system to 
stimulate cooperation and we conclude.  
 
2. Preliminaries  
In this section we introduce some preliminaries on LP problems and cooperative game 
theory.  
 
The mathematical formulation of an LP problem is max {cT x | A x ≤ b; x ≥ 0}, where, x∈ 
k
ℜ represents the decision variables, c ∈ kℜ represents the objective function 
coefficients, which reflect in many cases the prices, b ∈ mℜ is the right hand side, which 
is often identified with the resource bundle, and A∈ mk*ℜ  is the production matrix. 
We can obtain shadow prices for all resources by solving the dual LP problem 
corresponding to the above described problem.  The dual is min { yT b | y A ≥ c, y ≥ 0}, 
where y ∈ mℜ  represents the vector of shadow prices. A shadow price is the marginal 
value of a resource. Hence, a unit increase of a certain resource leads to an approximate 
increase of the objective function with the shadow price of this resource.  
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In cooperative game theory economic agents are called players. Let N be a finite 
set of players and let 2N denote the collection of all subsets of N, which are called 
coalitions. The coalition in which all players are included, N, is called the grand 
coalition. 
A cooperative game is a the pair (N,v), where N={1, 2, …, n} is the set of players, 
and v : 2N → ℜ  is a map assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N a real number, such that 
v(Ø)=0. The function v is called the characteristic function of the game, v(S) is called the 
value of coalition S.  
The central question in cooperative game theory is how the value of the grand 
coalition should be divided amongst the players, such that all players have an incentive to 
cooperate. Frequently used division rules (or solution concepts), each with its own 
appealing characteristics, are the Shapley value, the compromise value and the nucleolus.   
The Shapley value, introduced by Shapley (1953), is based on the marginal 
contribution of a player if he joins some coalition. This marginal contribution reflects a 
measure of importance of the player in the game. The nucleolus, introduced by 
Schmeidler (1969) looks for an allocation that minimises (lexicographically) the worst 
inequity, i.e., it minimises the maximum dissatisfaction of each coalition. The 
compromise value, introduced in Tijs (1989), is the efficient allocation that is a 
compromise between two non-efficient allocations of which one is the best for each 
player and the other one the minimum each player can claim.  
For the mathematical formulation and the discussion of the appealing properties 
of the Shapley value, the compromise value and the nucleolus we refer to Tijs (2003).  
 
At this point we turn to the special class of games where LP and cooperative game theory 
are combined. Owen (1975) introduced linear production (LP) games, which combine LP 
models to create cooperative games. Let c, x ∈ kℜ  and matrix A ∈ mk*ℜ  as in the LP 
model and bi ∈ 
m
ℜ  denote a resource vector for each individual player i ∈ N. A linear 
production game (N,v) is a cooperative game in which the characteristic function is 
defined as v(S) = max{ cTx | Ax ≤ b(S), x ≥ 0}, where b(S) =∑i∈S bi is the resource bundle 
owned by coalition S. Hence, the LP model determines the value of coalition S.  
Moreover, Owen (1975) introduced a division rule specifically developed for LP 
games. This division rule is called the Owen value and is based on the duality concept of 
linear programming and uses the shadow prices to divide the gains of the grand coalition. 
Each player receives, based on the shadow prices, the marginal value of his own resource 
bundle.   
 
3. The cooperative model 
In this section we introduce the cooperative model that provides a framework for 
modelling cooperative farm decisions in developing countries. In Section 5 we apply this 
model to a group of farm households in Northern Nigeria. The novelty of this model is 
that it consists of the combination of two mathematical disciplines: linear programming 
and cooperative game theory. Linear programming is a well-established tool in 
optimising farm plans (Hazell and Norton (1986)). The advantage of using cooperative 
game theory in combination with LP is that an optimal farm plan of a group of farmers 
can be determined. Moreover, fair division rules from cooperative game theory can be 
used to divide the gain obtained in the farm cooperative.  
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We start with a description of the decision variables, the objective function and the 
constraints of the LP model. This LP model is inspired by a basic farm household LP 
model as presented in Schweigman (1985, pp. 18-30) and Hazell and Norton (1986) and 
the exact mathematical formulation is given in Appendix A.  
 
The decisions a farmer has to take are manifold, though one can generally group these 
into decisions on production, consumption and market. The next table presents a 
summary of the decision variables a farmer has to take into account. 
 
Table 1: Decision Variables 
Type of decision variables Description decisions 
Production decisions (yearly) Assignment of area to cropping systems  
Consumption decisions (monthly) Consumption of different crops  
Market decisions (monthly) 
 
Selling/buying of different crops 
Buying fertiliser 
Hiring labour / out hiring labour 
Taking / Paying off a loan 
 
 
The production decisions of a farmer can be expressed by the assignment of land to 
different cropping systems. The farmer needs to decide which crops he wants to cultivate, 
which methods he wants to use to grow his crops, and when he will apply labour, 
fertiliser, etc. These choices are limited, because they depend on externalities, like 
climate, soil, etc. Therefore we introduce cropping systems, which summarise the limited 
choices of growing certain crops, or combinations of crops. For each cropping system it 
is predefined which crops are grown in the system, how much labour is required in each 
month and how much fertiliser needs to be applied. The farmer can divide his/her land 
into areas and he can assign a cropping system to each area. For example, there can be a 
cropping system “Rice (high inputs)”, as opposed to “Rice (low inputs)”, that requires a 
higher amount of fertiliser and labour, and as a result of the high inputs, has higher 
yields, than “Rice (low inputs)”. The farmer needs to decide if he/she wants to cultivate 
rice, and if so, he/she can assign a certain piece of land to the “Rice (high inputs)”-system 
or the “Rice (low inputs)”-system, or both. The assignment of all land to cropping 
systems is called a farm plan, with production quantities of crops as main outcome. 
Observe that leaving land fallow is also an option. 
The consumption decisions depend on the nutritional value of crops, the food 
habits and the availability of crops. The farmer needs to decide how much his family 
consumes of each crop in each month. 
The most important market decisions are decisions on trading of different crops, 
buying fertiliser, hiring (out) labour, and taking or paying off a loan. Note that all 
decision variables are related with each other. For example, decisions on selling and 
buying of a certain crop are related to the production of this crop and its chosen 
consumption level.  
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The objective in the model is to maximise the gross margin of the crop production. To 
calculate the gross margin, the costs of hired labour and fertiliser needs in production are 
subtracted from the revenue, which is the total production valued at market prices. The 
revenue depends on the chosen farm plan, the yields and the prices of the different crops. 
The cost of hired labour depends on the total number of hired labour hours and the wage 
rate, while the cost of the fertiliser depends on the farm plan, the required fertiliser inputs 
for each cropping system and the fertiliser prices.  
This objective has been used frequently in applications of farm household models 
in SSA (Hazell and Norton (1986)). Many authors (Upton, 1996; Abdoulaye and Sanders, 
2006; Woelcke, 2006) claim that monetary objectives, like gross margin, profit, income, 
net revenue optimisation are suitable if a subsistence constraint is included in the model 
to guarantee enough consumption in the household. We show later that in our model this 
constraint is included. Further note that when modelling cooperation, dividing currency 
amongst farmers is understandable, while other objectives are less straightforward to 
allocate. 
 
The constraints need to reflect the farm household situation. Table 2 gives an overview of 
the constraint types of the model. 
 
Table 2: Overview Constraint types 
Type of constraint
∗
 Resource parameter 
Land:   - Common fields (1) 
            - Fadama fields (2) 
Available area: - Common 
- Fadama 
Labour (monthly) (3) Available labour 
Storage balances (monthly calculation of 
quantity crops in store) (4-8) 
Initial storage 
Capital balances (monthly availability of money) 
(9-10) 
Non-agricultural income and other 
expenditures, initial capital 
Subsistence constraints (11-12) Minimal nutritional needs  
Loan constraints:  - paying back loan (13) 
                              - maximum loan (14) 
Maximum amount available loan  
Time which is spent on wage labour (monthly) 
(15) 
Maximum hours available to spend 
on wage labour 
 
 
First, we introduce a land constraint. The total area used for the different cropping 
systems cannot exceed the available land. To make the model specific to the region, we 
include an extra restriction for the use of fadama area (low lands) for cropping systems 
that include crops with high demand on water, such as rice, sugarcane etc.  
Second, we incorporate monthly constraints for labour supply, because the labour 
requirements for the chosen farm plan cannot exceed the available labour (including hired 
labour and excluding labour hired out). Note that we include the constraints on a monthly 
basis because the requirements fluctuate during the year. During the weeding and 
                                                 
∗ The numbers in brackets behind the constraint types refer to the inequalities in the Appendix. 
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harvesting period the labour requirements are high, while there are no labour 
requirements outside the growing season.    
Moreover, we include monthly storage and capital balances. We use two extra 
constraints to include the assumption that purchased food crops are used for consumption 
and not for trade. Further a restriction is introduced for perishable crops, which cannot be 
stored for a long period (i.e., vegetables) and two constraints are incorporated to include 
the crop leftover of the previous cropping season as initial storage. The capital balance 
depends on the income and expenditures. Each month changes in loans, income and 
expenditures of trading in crops, expenses on required fertiliser and hired labour, income 
from labour hired out, non-agricultural income and other expenditures influence the 
capital balance. An extra constraint is included to initialise the capital at the start of the 
growing season.    
Furthermore, subsistence consumption is satisfied by incorporating two 
constraints for the minimum nutritional intake of energy and protein needed in the family 
during the target year, which are the twelve months from the end of the harvest season. 
The first constraint guarantees that the consumption during the 5 months after the harvest 
contains enough energy and protein. The second constraint assures that the nutrient 
contents of the stored food crops at the end of the year are sufficient for the first 7 months 
(growing season) of the next year.  
We include two constraints on lending. The loan taken during a year should be 
paid back before the end of the year and there is a maximum amount of money which can 
be borrowed.  
Finally, a constraint is incorporated to set a maximum to the monthly amount of 
time the farmer is able to work on other farms to earn additional income against the local 
wage rate. This last constraint is included to reflect the non-permanent demand for 
agricultural wage labour, which leads to limited possibilities for getting an outside job.  
 
Next, we introduce the LP game as defined in Section 2, by using the above-described LP 
model. The ingredients needed for an LP game, are the players, the objective function, 
the production matrix and the resource bundles. The players of the LP game are a group 
of farm households from a certain village. The objective function for each player is to 
maximise the gross margin. Furthermore, in line with the assumption of local 
homogeneity in production technologies, the production matrix is the same for everybody 
in the village, meaning that prices and production functions do not differ amongst farmers 
in the same village. But, as we observed before, farm households are heterogeneous in 
resources, hence each player has a different resource bundle.  
 
4. Data and area of study    
This section provides general information on data collection. Village level data, which is 
used for the objective function and the production matrix, is discussed shortly, while farm 
specific (resource) data is discussed in more detail. 
We apply the model to a case study based on the situation in Ikuzeh village, 
Kajuru Local Government Area, Kaduna State, Nigeria. This village is located in the 
Northern Guinea Savannah. This agroecological zone is defined by a length of growing 
period of 151-180 days and unimodal rainfall pattern. Kadara is the major ethnic group in 
the village. Main crops include sorghum, maize and cowpea for upland fields. In the 
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lowlands, sugarcane and rice are cultivated in the village. The village has low population 
density and the main weekly market is distant. In 2002 a baseline survey was carried out 
in 39 randomly selected households (IITA, 2002). From this survey we obtain 
information on land use strategies, yields, input use, farm sizes and social characteristics 
like household size, education level, age of the household head and asset and livestock 
ownership. During the growing season of 2005 we collected additional data on a 
biweekly basis. This includes budget and market data as well as data on labour 
requirements for different crops, and wage rates. Furthermore we collected additional 
information on the wage labour market during several field visits in 2006. We corrected 
the 2005 and 2006 price data for inflation, such that the complete set is representative for 
2002. 
Next, we present the village level data, which we use to determine the parameters of the 





Table 3: Crops and cropping systems included in the model 

















Sugarcane (sole) (Low Input) Sugarcane 802 274 3720 46 0.251 10 
Rice (sole) (Low Input) Rice 1421 13 775 59 1.508 75 
Rice (sole) (High Input) Rice 1485 85 1107 59 1.508 75 
Maize (sole) (Low Input) Maize 593 27 327 32 1.492 95 
Maize (sole) (High Input) Maize 640 122 750 32 1.492 95 
Sorghum (sole) (Low Input) Sorghum 487 0 200 31 1.437 101 
Sorghum (sole) (High Input) Sorghum 571 67 400 31 1.437 101 









145 61 1.446 222 
Late Millet (sole) (Low Input) Late Millet 487 8 637 33 1.425 97 
Hungry Rice (sole) (Low Input) Hungry rice 253 0 335 69 1.399 122 
Soybean (sole) (Low Input) Soybean 549 0 363 32 1.404 380 
Groundnut (sole) (Low Input) Groundnut 434 0 406 27 1.626 182 
Cassava (sole) (Low Input) Cassava 977 0 1682 17 0.457 9 
Cocoyam (sole) (Low Input) Cocoyam 706 0 1158 24 0.360 15 
Okra (sole) (Low Input) Okra 253 0 400 68 0.130 16 
Hot Pepper (sole) (Low Input) Hot pepper 253 9 435 40 0.117 12 
 
 
The first column of Table 3 gives the cropping systems, based on the responses in the 
baseline survey. The second column presents the corresponding crops. To reflect the 
continuous production function in this non-continuous approach we include two  options 
for most common crops, one with high fertiliser use and labour requirements (high input 
use) and high yields and one with low input use and low yields. Observe that other levels 
can be chosen in the farm plan, by taking a mix of low and high input cropping systems. 
Furthermore sorghum-cowpea relay is a commonly practiced system, in which first 
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sorghum is planted, and later in the growing season cowpea is planted in-between the 
sorghum.  
Columns three, four and five of Table 3 present the total labour requirements, the 
total required fertiliser and the yields. We estimate labour requirements from the 
fortnightly survey in 2005, and estimate crop yields and fertilizer inputs from the baseline 
survey of 2002. In the last columns we present the average crop price (KADP, 2002) and 
the energy and protein contents (FAO, 2007) of each crop.  
The other data in the production matrix are the wage rates, which are estimated 
based on the fortnightly surveys of 2005 and fertiliser prices (KAFC, 2002). The average 
wage rate is approximately 26 Naira per hour and the average fertiliser price is 37 Naira 
per kg. 
 
The baseline survey of 2002 is used to characterise the 39 households and estimate their 
resource parameters.  
Calculations of the farm and fadama size and the value of assets follow 
straightforward from the baseline survey. For calculation of the livestock ownership, we 
convert the livestock into standard tropical livestock units (TLU) using 1 TLU = 250 kg 
(equals 10 goats) (Jahnke, 1982). 
Computations of the labour availability and household subsistence nutritional 
requirements are based on the household structure, incorporating differences between 
children, men and women and their respective participation in agricultural production. To 
calculate labour availability we assume that each participating person works 30 days a 
month for 6 hours a day and that leisure takes place during the remaining hours of the 
day. Hence, we assume everybody is willing to work 6 hours a day. Furthermore we 
convert women and child labour into standard man-hours, using correction factors 0.67 
and 0.5 respectively, based on Van Heemst et al. (1981). During interviews in 2006 we 
learned that the average time spend on agricultural wage labour is 10%. This percentage 
is used to calculate the maximum outgoing labour hours. The nutritional requirements are 
estimated based on the FAO (2007). 
We estimate the maximum loan sizes based on the fortnightly surveys and on the 
resources, i.e., collateral, of the individual 39 farmers, such as farm size, stated value of 
assets and livestock. 
Data on non-agricultural income and other expenses, like cooking items, health 
care etc, has been collected for a subset of the farmers. The village is far from the market, 
therefore the possibilities of earning non-agricultural wage are limited and the amount of 
extra income is observed to be low in all households. The amount spent on other 
expenses is observed to be more or less equal among all households. Therefore we 
assume that non-agricultural income and other expenses are equal for each household in 
the village, i.e., a net income of approximately 24000 Naira for each farm- household.  
 
Before we apply the model, for both computational and presentable convenience, we use 
cluster analysis to classify farmers into homogeneous groups (Hazell and Norton, 1986). 
Based on the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis of the 39 farmers we group 
farmers into five clusters A, B, C, D, E and calculate the average characteristics in each 
cluster, and we construct five averages for each farmers’ cluster. In the remainder of this 
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paper we refer to them as farmer A, B, C, D and E. In the next section we analyse the 
attractiveness of cooperation between these five average farmers. 
The 39 households are clustered using data on farm size, area for fadama, 
household size, livestock ownership and household stated assets, such as tools, radio, 
bicycle etc. In Table 4 the average characteristics of the five clusters are presented. We 
show characteristics used for the clustering, as well as the farm specific resource bundles 
used in the model, i.e., farm and fadama size, labour availability, energy and protein 
requirements, loan availabilities. 
  
Table 4: Characteristics of the five clusters   
 Cluster A B C D E 
Number of farmers 23 8 4 2 2 
Farmsize (ha) ab 4,72 6,45 18,07 13,70 6,05 
Fadama (ha)ab 0,45 0,72 1,96 2,23 0,52 
Household size (# persons) a 6.2 14.6 11.5 11.0 6.0 
Ownership Livestock (TLU) a 0.5 1.7 0.9 5.7 3.2 
Value of stated Assets (Naira)a  2900 5700 3000 2600 53700 
Labour (Man hours / month)b 570 980 885 1104 561 
Outgoing Labour (Man hours /month)b 57 98 88.5 110.4 56.1 
Energy required (MJ) b 1484 2402 2778 2957 1560 
Protein required (g) b 5664 9189 10428 11235 5898 
Maximum Loan (Naira) b 0 2850 2850 5700 5700 





 Resource parameter 
 
From Table 4 we learn that the available (outgoing) labour and the protein and energy 
requirements are strongly correlated with the household size. This is not surprising as 
those parameters depend on the composition of the households. Furthermore we see that 
cluster A contains the largest group of farmers. The farmers in this cluster are the least 
endowed, since they have the smallest land and livestock holdings. Farmers from cluster 
E do not differ much from A with regards to household size and farm size, but both 
livestock ownership and stated assets are higher. Farmers from cluster B have similar 
farm size available as those from E, but the household size is larger and the stated assets 
and livestock units are smaller. Farmers from cluster C and D have both large farms and a 
larger than average household size. While those from cluster C have the largest farm size 
and those from cluster D are best endowed with livestock.  
 
5. Case Study 
In this section we apply the cooperative model, as described in Section 3, to the five 
average farmers described in the previous section.  
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5.1 LP solutions 
We solve the LP model for each average farmer of cluster A, B, C, D, and E. The solution 
to the LP model results in an optimal farm plan for each individual farmer. Furthermore, 
we consider the optimal farm plan of the grand coalition or cooperative. Therefore we 
solve an additional LP model based on the aggregation of resources of the five farmers. 
For ease of comparison with the optimal solution in the cooperative, we sum the 
individual farm plans (i.e., the case without cooperation). In Figure 1 we present the 
optimal farm plans of the individuals, the sum of the individuals and the cooperative.  
 
Figure 1: Optimal farm plans  
















First, observe from Figure 1, that all individual farm plans are different, which is clearly a 
result of the different resources. Furthermore farmers A and B use 3 different cropping 
systems in their optimal farm plans, while farmers C and D use 4 cropping systems and 
both have fallow land, and farmer E uses 5 cropping systems. Note that the fallow land of 
farmers C and D is due to their large land holdings (see Table 1) and the lack of 
complementary resources. Further, in all farm plans Sorghum-Cowpea relay is the 
dominant cropping system, with more than 50 % of the cultivated area allocated to these 
crops.  
Next we compare the sum of the individual farm plans with the farm plan of the 
cooperative. We observe that all individual farmers together, fallow approximately 12 
hectares, while in the cooperative fallow land reduces to 8.5 hectares. Area used for 
growing sorghum-cowpea relay and sugarcane is expanded, while cultivation of okra, 
cassava and hungry rice decrease in cooperation. Note that this shift is towards 
sugarcane, a high-value crop, and sorghum-cowpea, both products with high nutritional 
values. This shows that in the cooperative a different optimal farm plan is found, whereby 
resources are used differently.  
 
Table 5 shows the resources and corresponding gross margins for the individuals, the sum 





Table 5: Gross Margin for individuals, the sum of individuals and the grand 
coalition 
  A B C D E A+...+E N 
Farm (ha) 4,72 6,45 18,07 13,70 6,05 48,99 48,99 
Fadama (ha) 0,45 0,72 1,96 2,23 0,52 5,88 5,88 
Labour (hrs) 570 980 885 









Energy (MJ) 1484 2402 2778 2957 1560 11181 11181 
Protein (g) 5664 9189 10428 11235 5898 42414 42414 









income (Naira) 24361 24361 24361 24361 24361 121805 121805 
 Gross Margin (Naira) 271099 396074 604609 800591 321885 2394258 2685004 
Source: Result of own calculations, 1 USD = 133 Naira (December 2002) 
 
Note that the last two columns of Table 5 are the same with respect to the resources, as 
by definition the resources of the grand coalition, N, equals the sum of all individual 
resources. Furthermore, the results show that the sum of the gross margin of all individual 
farmers (A+B+C+D+E) is equal to 2.394.258 Naira, while the gross margin of the 
cooperative is 2.685.004 Naira, an improvement of 12%. This translates to an average 
growth of 6000 Naira in income per head for the farm households in the cooperative.  
 
5.2 Game theory solution concepts 
Clearly, cooperation leads to substantial improvements in gross margin. But to actually 
form the cooperative, the farmers need to have a clear economic incentive to join.  
Potentially, one of the main impediments to cooperation is distrust about the fairness of 
the division rule (Cruijsen et al, 2005). Therefore, in this section, we apply methods from 
cooperative game theory to determine fair division rules, taking into account each 
player’s impact within the cooperative.  
We apply the linear production game, as described in Section 3, to analyse the 
farm cooperative. The farmers form the set of players, N={A,B,C,D,E}, and we construct 
the game as defined in Section 2, using the LP model in Section 3 and the data of the 
average farmers in Section 4. Table 6 presents the complete LP-game (N,v). Hence, v(S) 
reflects the gross margin resulting from the LP model solved for coalition S.   
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Table 6: Game for Gross Margin Maximisation  
S v(S) S V(S) S v(S) S v(S) S V(S) 
A 271099 AB 667173 ABC 1507522 ABCD 2351735 N 2685004 
B 396074 AC 954334 ABD 1625392 ABCE 1835246   
C 604609 AD 1137887 ABE 999496 ABDE 1955472   
D 800591 AE 600965 ACD 1754925 ACDE 2166980   
E 321885 BC 1212479 ACE 1328126 BCDE 2388637   
  BD 1349520 ADE 1471518     
  BE 728397 BCD 2050770     
  CD 1405200 BCE 1541344     
  CE 1029093 BDE 1679716     
  DE 1173810 CDE 1866015     
Source: Result of own calculations. Note: Values are given in Naira, 1USD = 133 Naira 
(December 2002) 
 
First, note the intuitively straightforward interpretation of the values of the game in Table 
6. Recall from Table 4 that farmers C and D are both better endowed than the other 
farmers, which is reflected in their gross margin (value) in Table 6. If both farmer C and 
D take part in larger coalitions this also leads to higher values.  
Furthermore, recall that both farmers C and D have an excess of land and a 
shortage of labour, hence, they do not have complementary resources, as a result of 
which cooperation does not lead to extra gains. This is also reflected in the game because 
v({C,D}) = v({C}) + v({D}). Observe that the same argument, although for different 
resources, holds for the farmers A and B, which both have excess of labour and shortage 
of land. Moreover, coalitions {A, E} and {B, E} have not many complementary resources 
and their extra gains are low, albeit nonzero. This is reflected in the game since for 
coalition {A, E} we have v({A, E}) ≈ v({A}) + v({E}). This similarly holds for coalition 
{B, E}.  
Finally, note that farmers A, B and E have similar excess resources, which equally 
applies, albeit for different resources to, farmers C and D. Intuitively, coalitions formed 
by two or more players from both these groups, exploit complementarities in resources, 
hence giving an extra gain to the players. Observe,  for example v({B, C}) is considerably 
higher than the sum of the individual values v({B}) and v({C}). In fact the extra gains 
between these two players are highest.    
 
Hence, we see that forming a coalition in many cases, but not all, leads to extra gains. 
But, farmers’ contributions to the extra gains vary. As emphasized before, the gross 
margin earned by the grand coalition (cooperative) needs to be divided such that every 
farm household has an incentive to cooperate. We address this issue in the remaining part 
of this section. 
 
First we discuss the Owen value, which is a game theoretical solution concept, 
specifically developed for LP games. The Owen value is based on the shadow prices of 
the resources, which reflect their marginal value. Table 7 shows the shadow prices of the 
LP model for the grand coalition. 
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Table 7: Shadow prices for the grand coalition  
 Shadow price 
(Naira) 
Farm (ha) 0 
Fadama (ha) 187906 
Labour (hrs) 341 
Outgoing labour (hrs) 267 
Energy (MJ) 0 
Protein (g) 0 
Loan (Naira) 4 
Source: Result of own calculations, 1 USD = 133 Naira (December 2002) 
 
Recall from Figure 1 that not all land resources are used by the grand coalition. This 
implies a shadow price for farm land of zero. Furthermore the shadow price of fadama 
fields is high. This is expected, because fadamas, the only fields where farmers can grow 
the high value crop sugarcane, are scarce in the dry region of study. Moreover, note that 
17% of the fields is left fallow due to a lack of labour, thus the shadow price of labour is 
positive. The shadow price of labour (341 Naira) is high compared to the average wage 
rate of 26 Naira per hour. Note that this means that if the cooperation uses one extra hour 
of labour (which can only be hired labour, for 26 Naira), it will result in a gross margin 
which is 341 Naira higher. However, a lack of capital impedes additional use of hired 
labour. Because of this lack of capital, we also find a positive shadow price for resources 
related to capital, such as loans and outgoing labour.  
Further note that the nutritional requirements both have shadow prices of zero, 
which means that these requirements are not binding in the grand coalition. Hence, a 
slight increase in nutritional requirements, does not affect the gross margin and the farm 
plan of the cooperative. 
 
Next we calculate the Owen value for each farmer. Therefore we value the individual 
resources with help of the shadow prices described above. Note that one should interpret 
the value of the solution concept as the share of the gross margin that a farmer (player) 
receives when forming the grand coalition. Table 8 presents and compares the individual 
gross margin and the Owen value for each farmer. Note that in this table the share which 
a farmer gets in cooperation is compared with his individual earnings, the increase is 
given in Naira and percentages. 
 









A 271099 294064 22965 8 
B 396074 507686 111613 28 
C 604609 705772 101163 17 
D 800591 849192 48601 6 
E 321885 328290 6406 2 
Source: Result of own calculations, 1 USD = 133 Naira (December 2002) 
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The results show that especially farmers B and C gain considerably with cooperation, as 
we expected from the game in Table 6. These improvements can be explained by the 
shadow prices. Farmer B has 150 man-hours per hectare (= 980/6.45) of labour available, 
which is the highest relative labour availability amongst all farmers. In his individual 
farm plan the shadow price of labour is zero, because not all of this resource is used, 
while labour has a high value in the grand coalition. The improvement of farmer C is 
mainly due to the high shadow price of fadama fields, of which farmer C owns relatively 
many. Furthermore, we observe that farmer E has a small increase of 2%, which means 
that in his individual farm plan, his resources are already used nearly efficient  
 
In Section 2 we described other commonly used solution concepts in cooperative game 
theory. In Table 9 we show the results for all these solution concepts. The first row 
displays the individual gross margins. The next rows present the Owen value, the Shapley 
value, the compromise value and the nucleolus.  
 
Table 9: Individual gross margin and all solution concepts, all values are in Naira 
 A B C D E 
Individual Gross 
Margin  
271099 396074 604609 800591 321885 
Owen Value 294064 507686 705772 849192 328290 
Shapley value 293549 489746 702090 853221 346399 
Compromise value 291838 507521 711678 845228 328739 
Nucleolus 295453 507446 705537 845753 330815 
Source: Result of own calculations, 1 USD = 133 Naira (December 2002) 
 
The different solution concepts allocate values to the farmers in case of cooperation, and 
we observe that all allocations are individually rational, i.e., each allocation gives to each 
player a higher value than its individual gross margin. For example, according to the four 
allocations, farmer A gets at least 291.838 Naira when cooperating with the other farmers, 
which is an absolute increase of 20.739 Naira compared to its individual gross margin.  
In fact, for three of the four solution concepts, it holds that for each sub-coalition 
the returns of the allocation of the grand coalition are higher than the returns of any 
smaller coalition. This means that no subgroup of the grand coalition has an incentive to 
split-off into a smaller coalition, i.e. these allocations are stable against coalitional split-
offs. Hence, an allocation (x1 ,x2 ,…,xn ) is called coalitional stable if ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S), for 
each possible coalition S, and ∑i∈N xi = v(N), where xi is the value allocated to farmer i.  
Note that the Owen value, the compromise value and the nucleolus are all 
coalitional stable, while on the other hand the Shapley value is not coalitional stable. For 
example, if we take coalition {B, C}, we observe in Table 6 a value of this coalition of 
1.212.479 Naira, whereas the table above shows that the Shapley value allocates only 
1.191.836 Naira (= 489746 + 702090) to them. Hence, for this coalition it is worth to 
split off from the grand coalition if the Shapley value is used to allocate the gains. To the 
contrary the Owen value, the compromise vale and the nucleolus allocate 1.213.458 
Naira, 1.219.199 Naira, and 1.212.983 Naira respectively to coalition {B, C}, which are 
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all higher than 1.212.479 Naira. Nevertheless, if we rank the farmers based on the 
allocation of each solution concept in a decreasing order, it results for all solution 
concepts in the order D-C-B-E-A. 
Next, we explore the relative increases and observe that the four solution concepts 
hardly differ from each other. Table 10 shows the relative increases for each player and 
each solution concept.  
 
Table 10: Relative increase in gains compared to the individual gross margin 
 A B C D E 
Owen Value 8% 28% 17% 6% 2% 
Shapley value 8% 24% 16% 7% 8% 
Compromise value 8% 28% 18% 6% 2% 
Nucleolus 9% 28% 17% 6% 3% 
 
Recall from the game (Table 6) that the extra gains are high for farmers B and C, which 
result in relatively large gains for both of them. Moreover, we rank the farmers based on 
their relative increases in a decreasing order, which results for all solution concepts, 
except for the Shapley value, in B-C-A-D-E. Note that farmer E has the lowest benefits, 
which is due to his efficient use of resources in the individual case. Finally, we see that 
only for farmer B and E the Shapley value is slightly different from the other solution 
concepts, while for the other farmers the Shapley value gives a similar outcome. For 
farmer E his marginal contributions are relatively high, even though he uses most of his 
resources quite efficiently in the individual case.  
It is an interesting feature that three out of four different solution concepts give 
very similar results. This is a very remarkable result, because these solutions are based on 
different point of views and have all its own appealing properties.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In the previous section we showed the promising results of the cooperative model, and 
the next step is to develop policies for stimulating cooperation in practice. In this section 
we provide a suggestion for the stimulation of cooperation, after which we summarise 
and discuss some issues for future research. 
Intuitively, both micro-credit projects targeting cooperative farmers and programs 
aimed at improving variable input supply, such as fertilizer, could be promising avenues. 
In the following we give an example to illustrate the potential benefits of a micro-credit 
system restricted to cooperating farmers. Such a micro-credit scheme could be beneficial 
for three different reasons. Firstly, a financial organisation is more likely to give credit to 
a cooperative than to individual farmers, as the risks of farmers defaulting on the loan are 
lower. Secondly, micro-credit provided to a cooperative might yield a higher pay-off 
compared to credit given to individual farmers. Finally, and maybe most importantly, the 
least endowed farmers in a cooperative would then benefit from credit, while they are not 
likely to have access to credit individually due to their low collateral. 
That said, accurate recommendations should be based on further detailed analysis, 
for example through the application of a framework such as the one developed in this 
paper. In order to get some insight into the impact of such policies, we briefly 
demonstrate the consequences of introducing a micro-credit project in which a loan of 
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1000 Naira is provided to each cooperating farmer, which should be paid back at the end 
of the growing season. We discuss the impact of this policy on the Owen value, since it is 
especially developed for LP games.  
We apply the LP model with modified resource vectors to the grand coalition, in 
which the loan availability is increased with 5000 Naira, as a result of an increase of 1000 
Naira per farmer. In Table 11 we compare the individual gross margin without micro-
credit with the individual gross margin with micro-credit and the two Owen values 
resulting from a cooperative without and with micro-credit respectively. We take the 
individual gross margin without micro-credit as baseline, and compare the results.  
 
Table 11: The impact of a micro-credit policy compared with individual case 
without cooperation (baseline) 
  A  B  C  D  E  
  *1000 
Naira 







271 100 396 100 605 100 801 100 322 100 
 Micro-
credit 






294 108 508 128 706 117 849 106 328 102 
 Micro-
credit 
298 110 511 129 712 118 855 107 331 103 
     
Table 11 shows that providing a micro-credit to individual farmers does not result in 
higher gross margins for the less endowed farmers A, B and E, whereas the well-endowed 
farmers C and D gain around 3 to 4 %. On the contrary, if a micro credit system is 
introduced which simultaneously stimulates cooperation, all farmers gain from the extra 
credit, given the restriction of cooperation. In case we divide according to the Owen 
value, the poorest farmer A can obtain 10 % extra gross margin and the other farmers 
gain as well from cooperation. Note that the largest part of the gains is a result of the 
cooperation, in addition, there is a small extra gain due to of the extra available credit. To 
summarise, individual micro-credit will not result in higher gains for the least endowed 
farmers, and will probably not be given to these farmers due to their low collateral and 
the high risks of defaulting on their loans, whereas the returns of micro-credit provided to 
the cooperative will lead to increases for each famer. Hence, a micro-credit system which 
is restricted to cooperating farmers, stimulates the cooperation and is a pro-poor 
mechanism, ensuring that the poorest farmers can profit from the system. 
 
To conclude, this paper is a first step in a promising new approach in which farm 
household models are combined with game theory to analyse effects of cooperation on 
the profitability of farming. A cooperative farm household model is introduced and 
applied to a specific region in Northern Nigeria.  
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Findings from this paper clearly provide evidence that cooperation amongst 
farmers should be stimulated, because extra gains can be obtained. Moreover, potential 
for development and stability of cooperation is higher if fair division rules can be 
provided. We discussed four different solution concepts from game theory: the Owen 
value, Shapley value, compromise value, and nucleolus. They all show an individual 
rational outcome for the farmer cooperation, meaning that each individual farmer 
receives at least the same amount as when farming individually. Another interesting 
finding is that three solution concepts give similar results, although the rationale behind 
each division concept and its calculation is different.  
Observe that the framework presented in this paper can be used to study 
cooperation in different settings, e.g. different regions, inter-household situations, etc. 
Possible extensions for future research may include risk aversion, dynamic 
aspects or multi-objective functions. 
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AREAj ≤ landavailable (1)
∑
j∈Cfadama
AREAj ≤ fadamaavailable (2)
∑
j
AREAj ∗ labourrequiredj,t ≤ labouravailable + LABOURHIREDt
− LABOUROUTHIREDt ∀t = 1, .., T
(3)
STOREi,t = STOREi,t−1 +
∑
j
AREAj ∗ yieldijt − CONSTOREi,t − SELLi,t
∀i = 1, ..,K,∀t = 1, .., T (4)
FOODSTOREi,t = FOODSTOREi,t−1 + BUYi,t − CONFOODSTOREi,t
∀i = 1, .., K,∀t = 1, .., T (5)
STOREi,t + FOODSTOREi,t = 0 for i ∈ Kperishable∀t = 1, .., T (6)
STOREi,0 = initialstorei ∀i = 1, ..,K (7)
FOODSTOREi,0 = initialfoodstorei ∀i = 1, ..,K (8)








AREAj ∗ fertiliserrequiredj,t ∗ fertiliserprice
+ nonagriculturalincomet − otherexpensest
+ (LABOUROUTHIREDt − LABOURHIREDt) ∗ wageratet
∀t = 1, .., T (9)
CAPITAL0 = initialcapital (10)
∑
i
(CONSTOREit + CONFOODSTOREit) ∗cropnutrientsih




(STOREiT + FOODSTOREiT )









NEWLOANt ≤ maximumloan (14)
LABOUROUTHIREDt ≤ outgoinglabour (15)
All decision variables ≥ 0 (16)
